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I. Introduction
On January 13, 2010, Korean President Lee Myung-Bak1) signed into law 
the Low Carbon, Green Growth Fundamental Act (the “LCGGFA” or the 
“Act”).2) This sweeping piece of administrative legislation asserted to 
dramatically reform Korean environmental regulation and to integrate 
environmental considerations into a broad set of policy choices.3) More than 
just a watershed moment in Korean environmental law, the Act also 
presents a unique approach to the diverse problems and opportunities 
currently presented by changing environmental and climate conditions. 
The Act takes as its scope a general and inclusive understanding of the 
relationship between “green growth” and Korean society and economy. Its 
provisions range from direct supervision of energy and emission-related 
business and consumption practices,4) to channeled investment and 
stimulus for certain industries,5) to reform of the domestic tax code.6)  With 
the transition from President Lee to the new administration of current 
President Park Geun-Hye in 2013, the future of green growth was cast into 
doubt; after less than a year in office, President Park’s administration 
announced that it would continue to pursue the green growth vision, with 
a particular focus on climate change mitigation and adaptation, as “Green 
Growth 2.0.”7)   
Due to the Act’s original approach for fulfilling international standards 
1) This article generally follows the Korean practice of stating an individual’s family 
name first, followed by his or her given name. In the case of referenced sources written by 
Korean authors, the names are stated as they appear in the publication.
2) Jeotanso Noksaekseongjang Gibonbeop [Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green 
Growth], Act No. 9931 (Jan. 13, 2010).
3) According to the Act, “The State shall, whenever it formulates various policies, take 
into consideration impacts on the harmonized development of the economy and environment 
and climate change.” Art. 4(2). 
4) LCGGFA, Art. 42(5)-(11) (describing the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and 
energy consumption of so-called “controlled entities”).
5) See generally LCGGFA, Chapter 4.
6) LCGGFA, Art. 30.
7) Shin Hyon-hee, Korea eyes era of ‘green growth 2.0’, The Korea herald (Nov. 10, 2013).
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of environmental harm-reduction8) and advancing domestic economic and 
environmental strategies, and given the continued commitment that the 
Korean Executive has demonstrated to the green growth vision,9) other 
nations should now consider the possibility that Korea is emerging as an 
innovator in the area of administrative and environmental legislation. 
These innovations warrant the attention of other nations, and the 
international community, in designing “green” legislation.10) To explore the 
LCGGFA’s contributions to the international dialogue on environmental 
regulatory choices, we provide a number of theoretical perspectives for 
understanding and critiquing the LCGGFA, and further identify and 
discuss specific criticisms that may be leveled against this legislation. 
Korea’s experience with the LCGGFA informs the analysis of the usefulness 
of the Korean case as a model for other nations.
This article proceeds by providing an introduction to the structure and 
the key provisions of the Act. The precise connotations and conceptions 
contained within the Korean version of “green growth” are further refined 
by contrasting the principles embedded in the Korean legislation with the 
vision of “green growth” articulated by the OECD in its reports on the 
subject.11) The Act is then analyzed from the perspective of the regulatory 
instruments that it creates and proposes, in order to examine the policy 
ramifications of the Act and to test the proposition made by the Act’s 
supporters that it represents a dramatic move in the direction of incentive-
based instruments.12) We then consider two major criticisms that may be 
8) For a discussion of provisions of the LCGGFA relevant to satisfying international 
greenhouse gas emission mitigation standards, see Suh-Yong Chung, Jeotanso Noksaekseongjang 
Gibonbeopui Gukjebeopseok Geomto [Review of Basic Act on Low Carbon Green Growth from an 
International Law Perspective], 16 seoul InT. l. J. 49, 73 (2009).
9) See infra Section VI for a discussion of the status of Korean green growth under the 
present administration of President Park.
10) Korea has sought to utilize an expanding environmental policy leadership role to 
integrate green growth into international discourse. See Jae-Hyup Lee, John Leitner & 
Minjung Chung, The Road to Doha through Seoul: The Diplomatic and Legal Implications of the Pre-
COP 18 Ministerial Meeting, 12 J. Korean l. 55, 66-69 (2012). 
11) InTerIm reporT of The Green GroWTh sTraTeGy: ImplemenTInG our commITmenT for a 
susTaInable fuTure, OECD, C/Min(2010)5 (2010) (hereafter “OECD Interim Report”); ToWard 
Green GroWTh, OECD, 10-1787/9789264111318-en (2011) (hereafter “OECD Final Report”).
12) The decisive move towards incentive-based instruments stands in contrast to the 
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leveled against the Act, from a general and specific level. First, generally, 
does complexity theory advise against the approach adopted by the Act, as 
a matter of administrative law policy?  Secondly, and more specifically, if 
the proposition of a new and elaborate framework based around a 
touchstone concept survives a complexity theory analysis, is “green 
growth” the preferable basic concept? In particular, is “green growth” more 
promising as a policy bedrock than “sustainable development”13)?  
Our analysis continues by considering what nexus may form between 
the Act and legal systems external to Korea. We evaluate the possibility of 
legal “transplantation” by first articulating our meaning in employing this 
concept, and then identifying reasons why “transplantation”, so 
understood, is particularly vital for generating the linkages between 
domestic systems that many global environmental problems require. We 
then continue the analysis by examining the value that transplantation of 
Korean green growth may provide for foreign legal systems.
II. The LCGGFA
1. The Green Growth Concept
What is the substantive content of the concept of “green growth”? In a 
narrow and immediate sense, “green growth” describes in particular a set 
of institutions and policies that facilitates investment in, and development 
of, economic projects related to “green” industries, such as alternative 
energy sources, pollution-reduction inventions, and energy-efficiency 
elaborate and command-and-control oriented posture of pre-existing Korean environmental 
regulatory law. See Hong Sik Cho, Against the Viability of Private Enforcement: Focusing on 
Korean Environmental Law, 7 J. Korean l. 81, 94-97 (2007).
13) “Sustainable development” is enshrined as a foundational principle of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 3(4), GE.05-62220 (E) 200705, 
entered into force 1995, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
As indicated by the language of the Convention, sustainable development contemplates that 
environmental protection and harm reduction measures should be crafted to reflect the 
economic and social realities of developing nations, maintaining a dynamic and context-
specific balance of environment, economy, and social justice objectives. 
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technologies.14) However, a society that successfully develops these 
industries is not necessarily one that is also “low carbon”. A good example 
is China, a country that is currently experiencing considerable success in 
expanding green industries.15) However, China as a society continues to 
consume natural resources at an increasing rate. 16)  Its total carbon 
emissions per year are expected to continue to increase for another twenty 
years or longer,17) and until recently, the rate of growth of emissions (roughly 
related to the concept of “carbon intensity”18)) was also accelerating.19) The 
situation in China is further complicated by other environmental 
consequences that may result form the implementation of “green industry”, 
such as pollution and other contamination.20) Concerns about managing the 
broader environmental impact of industrial and consumer behavior in even 
“green technology”-invested societies leads to the balanced approach of 
green growth. Under the analysis established by the OECD, “Green growth 
can be seen as a way to pursue economic growth and development, while 
14) According to the OECD, green growth “builds on existing sustainable development 
initiatives in many countries and aims at identifying cleaner sources of growth, including 
seizing the opportunities to develop new green industries, jobs and technologies, while also 
managing the structural changes associated with the transition to a greener economy.”  OECD 
Interim Report, supra note 11, at 9. 
15) See, e.g., Dan Kedmey, This is How Far Ahead of the U.S. China is on Green Energy, TIme 
(May 21, 2014); Keith Bradsher, China Leading Global Race to Make Clean Energy, n.y. TImes (Jan. 
30, 2010).
16) The New York Times reported that in the fourth quarter of 2009 and the first quarter 
of 2010, China posted the “largest six-month increase in the tonnage of human generated 
greenhouse gases ever by a single country”. Keith Bradsher, China’s Energy Use Threatens Goals 
on Warming, n.y. TImes (May 6, 2010). China’s second quarter results demonstrated some 
subsequent reduction in carbon intensity.
17) See Matt McGrath, China’s Experts Divided over Carbon Emissions Peak, bbc (June 5, 
2014).
18) “Carbon intensity” refers to the amount of emitted carbon per standardized unit of 
GDP produced. Where growth in GDP itself is stable or decreasing, and the rate of carbon 
emissions is increasing, carbon intensity is increasing as well.
19) See Alex Morales, China Sticks to Carbon-Intensity Target, Dismisses CO2 Cap, bloomberG 
(June 4, 2013).
20) See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Solar Energy Firms Leave Waste Behind in China, 
WashInGTon posT (March 9, 2008) (describing environmental contamination from the 
production of solar panels in China). In the case of energy-efficiency production activities that 
are themselves harmful to the environment, a further source of tension between “green” and 
“growth” becomes evident.
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preventing environmental degradation, biodiversity loss and unsustainable 
natural resource use. It aims at maximising the chances of exploiting 
cleaner sources of growth, thereby leading to a more environmentally 
sustainable growth model.”21)
As formally invoked in Korean legislation, “green growth” has a larger 
if aspirational meaning. Under the LCGGFA, “green growth” is defined as 
“growth achieved by saving and using energy and resources efficiently to 
reduce climate change and damage to the environment, securing new 
growth engines through research and development of green technology…
and achieving harmony between the economy and environment”.22) It 
captures the simultaneous promotion of new industries that relate to 
environmentally sound technologies and the cultivation of a society that 
balances environmental consciousness and economic development. 
Applying this “green growth” strategy on the level of a national economy, 
GDP increases are driven by expansion of the “green economy”, while 
particular environmental goals are met (mitigating carbon emissions, 
maintaining ecological integrity, preserving biodiversity, and other 
qualitative standards for environmental protection).
2. Context and Purposes
Amongst the environmental challenges facing the societies of the world, 
climate change, destruction of habitats and reduction of biodiversity,23) 
ozone depletion, and natural resource management all have a significantly 
global character.24) Loss of environmental resources, including biodiversity 
and depletion of finite resource deposits, may impact particular societies 
21) OECD Interim Report, supra note 11, at 13.
22) Art. 2(2).
23) While the impacts of biodiversity loss may be less obviously of a shared and global 
character, the permanent deprivation of an environmental resource and qualitative injury to 
ecological richness are not limited by geopolitical boundaries. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, 
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the European Union and the International 
Community, 83 Va. l. reV. 1331, 1344 (1997).
24) See Jonathan Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal 
Context, yale l. J. 677, 690-91 (1999) (discussing the “global public good” of minimizing 
externalities with an uncontainably international character).
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most immediately, but the consequences bear a global character. The 
climate-related impact of greenhouse gas emissions and the depletion of 
ozone have a directly global impact, because the root cause activities, 
namely greenhouse gas emissions and the emission of ozone-destroying 
substances,25) each originate in a particular geographic location, but the 
materials in question, once released into the atmosphere, are not bound by 
borders. The accumulation of all the relevant emissions in the world 
collectively alters the chemistry of the atmosphere and renders a particular 
ecological consequence. The LCGGFA notes these environmental 
considerations in its text.26) 
The LCGGFA also sought to address the need, more pressing in light of 
the global economic recession then occurring, for a perceived economic 
stimulus plan. In its basic statement of purpose, the LCGGFA speaks to 
both economic and environmental imperatives: “The purpose of this Act is 
to promote the development of the national economy… so as to pursue the 
harmonized development of the economy and environment…”27)
Other stated purposes of the LCGGFA include advancing the state of 
environmental law and enforcement and providing a demonstration to the 
world of Korea’s emerging status as a responsible and sophisticated 
stakeholder (and co-solver of international problems).28) The international 
aspirations of the Act may relate to the objective of presenting Korea as a 
“top-class, advanced country”,29) but also reflect a practical economic 
dynamic, inasmuch as the legislation seeks to facilitate international 
cooperation that could benefit the Korean economy, such as “expansion in 
overseas markets”.30) The emphasis placed on a balance and harmony 
amongst the economy, environment, and quality of life of citizens31) is an 
apparent effort to advance green growth as a tangible embodiment of, and 
25) See Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, A Comprehensive Approach to Climate 
Change: Using the Market to Protect the Environment, am. enTerprIse 112 (1990).
26) See, e.g., Art. 38.
27) Art. 1.
28) In three separate articles, the LCGGFA states a purpose related to improving or 
advancing Korea’s status in the international community. Art. 1; Art. 3; Art. 61.
29) Art. 1.
30) Art. 61.
31) See, e.g., Art. 1.
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not a stark alternative to, sustainable development; the notion of 
sustainability is explicitly discussed as a foundational policy dimension of 
green growth.32)
3. Key Provisions
The Act seeks to establish a framework of duties and responsibilities, 
including binding obligations and incentivized voluntary behavior, for 
public and private parties, both institutional and individual. Beyond the 
general emphasis on responsibilities for the national government,33) the Act 
includes local government responsibilities,34) business entity responsibilities,35) 
and responsibilities for citizens.36) In the Korean context, one might ask 
whether the force of popular will and desire for environmentally sound 
social transformation has created the basis for meaningful “citizen 
responsibilities” for each individual.37)  The test of whether popular support 
for these measures exists will arise in the context of future lawmaking to 
create specific and binding obligations for the general public.
1) Implementation/Enforcement measures and related government bodies
The Act establishes a centralized structure of actors oriented around the 
key and highest-level decision-maker, the Korean president (the 
“President”). The Presidential Committee, the executive power-wielding 
body for the Act, is “instituted under the control of the President”.38) The 
functions of the Presidential Committee are vast and include making key 
determinations regarding the basic direction of policies under the Act, the 
development and execution of the national green growth and climate 
32) Art. 22; Art. 49.




37) For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the relationship between popular will 
and the enforcement of environmental law in Korea in general, see Hong Sik Cho, The 
Pathology of Korea’s Under-Enforcement of Environmental Law: Is Public Awareness and Deliberation 
the Key to Success?, 4 u. ToKyo J. l. and pol. 47-64 (2007).
38) Art. 14(1).
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change strategies, and supervision and support for administrative agencies 
as they participate in the implementation of green growth.39) The national 
strategy for green growth, as received and deliberated upon by the 
Presidential Committee, is developed by the “Government” (the executive 
branch, at the discretion and under the control of the President) and 
includes broad and comprehensive plans relating to the multifaceted 
concerns of the LCGGFA.40) The head of each central administrative agency 
is responsible for establishing and implementing an “action plan” for that 
agency, pursuant to Presidential Decree.41) Similarly, local government 
leaders can be instructed by Presidential Decree to advance and implement 
action plans for the local area in question.42) In all of these essential matters, 
the President resides at the focal point of policymaking and, through the 
influence he or she exerts on the composition and conduct of the 
Presidential Committee, the President possesses considerable power for 
managing green growth-related measures and initiatives.
2) Measures bearing on the “national economy”43)
Consistent with the many interconnections between green growth 
policy and national economic policy, the Act contains many provisions that 
articulate general principles for the relationship between “green” and 
“growth”, and provides specific initiatives and policy directions. The 
executive is instructed to undertake a central role in “materializing green 
economy”, including by identifying and fostering what it considers to be 
promising industries44) and supervising existing economic actors.45) Further 





43) Such measures include Art. 26 (Facilitation of Research, Development, and 
Commercialization of Green Technology), 28 (Support for and Boosting of Finance), 29 
(Establishment of and Support for Companies for Investment in Green Industries), 31 
(Support and Special Privileges for Green Technology and Green Industries), 32 
(Standardization and Certification of Green Technology and Green Industries), and 33 
(Support for Medium and Small Enterprises).
44) Act, Art. 23.
45) Act, Art. 25.
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in resource recycling.46) Numerous provisions relate to support for research 
and development and the subsequent product commercialization of green 
technology.47) The Act prescribes the government-facilitated establishment 
of “green finance” (measures to promote investment in key industries and 
development of useful financial instruments, and to create a carbon-trading 
market).48) Tax policy is to be reformed in the direction of “green” 
objectives.49) In general, the character of these provisions is to establish 
potentially broad discretion for the executive, with the latitude to exercise 
regulatory power to cultivate efficient incentives and stimulate the progress 
of “green industry”.
3) Measures bearing on “climate change”
Climate change lies at the heart of international environmental law 
negotiations. This issue squarely presents the challenge of achieving 
mutually reinforcing economic growth and environmental protection. 
Climate change is embedded in the underlying purposive fabric of the Act, 
and is explicitly discussed in certain key provisions. The government is 
instructed to compose and implement successive five-year plans 
concerning climate change, with the deliberation of the Presidential 
Committee and the State Council.50) Emission targets shall be set by sector 
and by individual “controlled entity” (emitter of a certain amount of 
greenhouse gases) as part of the target management scheme.51) The 
government is to establish reporting and information management 
standards for emissions.52) Of considerable domestic and international 
interest is the language concerning a greenhouse gas emission cap-and-
trade system (as the Act describes it, using “market functions”);53) the Act 
gives the government the discretion to introduce a carbon market, 54) a 
46) Act, Art. 24.






53) Art. 46; see also Art. 28.
54) Art. 46(3).
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course of action that the President and the Korean national assembly (the 
“National Assembly”) have jointly pursued.55) Finally, the research 
component of developing and refining climate change-related policies is 
addressed with a command to deepen and enhance the useful output of 
such research.56) While this chapter of the Act is most commonly discussed 
in the context of the cap-and-trade system, it advances a more immediate 
set of regulatory parameters related to the target management scheme for 
“controlled entities”.
Korea’s subsequent efforts to create an emissions-trading system 
illustrate that the President’s power, while broad, is not unchecked. The 
creation of a trading system has been the subject of extended debate by the 
National Assembly, which, after several rounds of legislative drafting, 
passed a bill to establish an emissions-trading system in May of 2012.57) The 
final bill garnered nearly unanimous support in the National Assembly, 
passing 145-0 (with three abstentions).58) The emissions trading system is 
currently scheduled to take effect at the beginning of 2015, though business 
groups continue to advocate for delayed implementation.59) While the law 
retains the approach of allowing for significant regulatory discretion, 
including pricing of emission permits, exact emissions caps, and enforcement 
practices,60) the legislative process reaffirmed that the President enjoys wide 
latitude in this area because the National Assembly deems that latitude to 
be efficacious policy. 
Another general category of notable provisions, related to the Korea-
legislated vision of “sustainable development”, is discussed in detail, infra 
Section IV(b).
55) S. Korea to start cap-and-trade from 2015: reports, reuTers (Feb. 25, 2011) (describing the 
first years of the iterative legislative drafting process for the Korean cap-and-trade bill).
56) Art. 48.
57) Onsilgas baechulkwonui haldang mit georae e gwanhan beopryul [Act on the 
Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse-gas Emission Permits], Act No. 11419, May 14, 2012.
58) Sangim Han, South Korean Parliament Approves Carbon-Trading System, bloomberG (May 
3, 2012).
59) Biz groups urge gov’t to reconsider cap-and-trade program, yonhap neWs (June 1, 2014).
60) See South Korea’s Emissions Trading Scheme, bloomberG neW enerGy fInance (2013), 
available at http://about.bnef.com/white-papers/south-koreas-emissions-trading-scheme/. 
312 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 13: 301
III.  Context of Korean Green Growth: Contrasted with the 
OECD Green Growth Vision
This section briefly discusses several points of comparison between the 
OECD elaboration of green growth61) and the framework currently being 
utilized in Korea. Specifically, we analyze the emphasis on environmental 
objectives relative to emphasis on economic growth; the focus on climate 
change relative to other environment-related objectives; and the level at 
which policy proposals are intended to be advanced (international vs. 
domestic). These distinctions highlight a number of unique features of 
Korean green growth and illustrate the potential of the Act to provide a 
novel contribution to the body of law- and policy-making in this area. Our 
purpose in drawing these distinctions is not to suggest that the OECD and 
Korea have incompatible visions for green growth, or that one is objectively 
preferable to or more coherent than the other. Rather, our purpose is to 
illustrate the accretive relationship between the OECD’s focus on green 
growth and Korea’s efforts to apply green growth in its domestic legal and 
economic affairs.
1.  Environmental and Economic Objectives: Importance of “Green” 
Relative to “Growth”
It is a mantra of green growth policy analysis, especially in Korea, that 
“green” and “growth” are mutually reinforcing and synergistic principles.62) 
Nonetheless, one can identify different points of emphasis in the inevitable 
trade-offs between a greater degree of environmental caution and a more 
aggressive strategy for short-term economic growth. In the OECD Interim 
Report and the OECD Final Report, an emphasis on urgent economic 
improvements is manifest even from the forewords, in which OECD 
61) The foundational sources for OECD-conceptualized green growth are the OECD 
Interim Report and the OECD Final Report, supra note 11.
62) See, e.g., Act, Art. 1 (stating that the purpose of the legislation is to seek “harmonized 
development of the economy and the environment”). See also Global Green GroWTh InsTITuTe, 
information available at http://www.gggi.org (describing the basic structure and objectives of 
a research institute founded in connection with the Act). 
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Secretary-General Angel Gurria describes the recent international economic 
downturn as “the greatest crisis of our lifetimes”63) and “the worst crisis 
most of us have ever known”.64) In the context of a green growth report, 
some might have imagined Mr. Gurria would refer to climate change as 
humanity’s most pressing challenge. Both reports reflect a consistent 
emphasis on generating short-term improvements in economic fortunes, as 
well as promoting longer-term goals of economic prosperity. The Korean 
approach, in both the language of the Act and subsequent commentary, 
rhetorically advances a balance of objectives and an insistence upon the 
co-equality of economics and environment.65) While the OECD version of 
green growth is calibrated to maintain broad appeal, including to societies 
with little capacity or willingness to defer economic gains, the Korean green 
growth system is explicitly articulated as long-range planning that realizes 
ultimate economic gains through environmentally responsible intermediate 
steps.
2. Is Climate Change Mitigation the Primary Environmental Objective?  
The OECD Interim Report generally regards mitigation of climate 
change (principally through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions) to 
be the environmental concern representing the “green” element of green 
growth.66) The OECD Final Report sets forth a set of environmental 
objectives and indicators that includes the human health effects of 
pollution, biodiversity loss, and water scarcity.67) These indicators capture a 
broader range of environmental issues than were explicitly considered in 
63) OECD Interim Report, supra note 11, at 7.
64) OECD Final Report, supra note 11, at 3.
65) See J.S. Lee, Green GroWTh: Korean InITIaTIVes for Green cIVIlIzaTIon, 34-36 (2010) 
(defining green growth as “economic growth and economic progress at the same time” and 
raising the possibility of building “environmental capital” as part of green growth policy); 
Sang In Kang, Jin-gyu Oh & Hongseok Kim, Korea’s Low-Carbon Green Growth Strategy, OECD 
Working Paper No. 310, 16-25 (2012) (describing and evaluating green growth strategies for 
accomplishing carbon-mitigation and economic development simultaneously and 
collaboratively).
66) See OECD Interim Report, supra note 11, at Box 2, p. 16, Section III, Preliminary Results 
on key elements of the green growth toolkit, 23-41.
67) Id. at 129-130.
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the OECD Interim Report, but are ultimately framed in terms of a 
consolidated analysis that is oriented towards maintaining economic 
growth.68) Korea has directly utilized the OECD indicators approach, 
becoming one of the first nations69) to conduct an official self-evaluation 
based on these indicators.70)
However, Korean green growth arguably extends the scope of its 
environmental agenda beyond that of the OECD’s green growth analysis 
by explicitly defining an environmental agenda that includes but is not 
limited to the concept of “low carbon” emissions.71) In particular, it places 
considerable emphasis upon areas of environmental concern that address 
quality of life,72) as well as qualitative value judgments about the need to 
reduce pollution and preserve natural habitats.73) Korea has a considerable 
body of law and regulation related to these issues, but until recently 
enforcement has not been strong and uniform.74) This issue will be 
discussed further, infra, in connection with suitability of green growth for 
developing nations; in the context of advancing green growth agendas in 
nations less developed than Korea, both the OECD indicators approach and 
the broad set of Korean objectives provide valuable guidance. 
68) See id. at 126-129 (describing obstacles to the realization of verifiable, incremental 
returns on investment to justify green growth policies).
69) OECD, Green Growth in Action: Korea, available at http://www.oecd.org/korea/
greengrowthinactionkorea.htm.
70) Statistics Korea, Korea’s Green GroWTh based on oecd Green GroWTh IndIcaTors 
(2012).
71) The language of the Act asserts a vision of harmony between human society and the 
natural environment. See, e.g., Arts. 1, 2, 4, and 6. According to early commentary, the Korean 
policy concept of green growth is “broader than the narrowly defined climate change issues”. 
See J.S. Lee, supra note 65, at 93.
72) As a matter of principle and the highest domestic legal instruction to government 
actors, the Constitution of Korea states, “All citizens shall have the right to a healthy and 
agreeable environment. The State and all citizens shall endeavor to protect the environment.” 
Heonbeop  [Constitution of the Republic of Korea], Art. 35(1).
73) See Act, Art. 46 (identifying ecological conservation as a fundamental policy goal).
74) See Cho, supra notes 12 and 37.
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3. Domestic and International Forums for Policy Advancement  
It is not surprising that the OECD places considerable emphasis on 
international agreement and joint implementation of green growth-related 
policies. In part, this relates to the notion that “green” domestic policies 
may undermine collective economic objectives.75) To address such 
perceived conflicts, much OECD analysis is targeted at fostering 
cooperation between the OECD nations and non-OECD nations.76) Korean 
green growth contemplates bilateral and multilateral cooperation and 
potential regional initiatives,77) but is fundamentally based on domestic 
legal reform and political administration. 
However, such domestic efforts can serve as a bridge to international 
cooperation. Korea has made significant efforts to integrate green growth 
with international institutions, as demonstrated by two conspicuous 
examples.78) Korea was selected to host the secretariat of the recently 
formed Green Climate Fund (the “GCF”). The GCF was created by the 
decision of the parties at the Conference of Parties 16 for the purpose of 
raising and allocating $100 billion per year by the year 2020 for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.79) Headquartered in the “U-City” of 
Songdo, the GCF is on schedule to begin receiving financial pledges late in 
2014.80) In addition, the Korean government chartered and provided 
essential funding for the Global Green Growth Institute (“GGGI”). GGGI’s 
successful conversion into an international organization in 2012 has 
allowed it to pursue an increasingly ambitious and global agenda, while the 
GCF has made considerable progress in the operational rule-making 
process and laid the foundation for significant fundraising. In each case, 
Korea has thus far been able to infuse its international leadership roles with 
75) See, e.g., OECD Interim Report, supra note 11, at 20, “Market Failures”; 31 
(environmentally harmful subsidies); and 41, “Leakage”.
76) Id. at 14.
77) Act, Art. 61.
78) See Lee et al., supra note 10, at 71-73.
79) reporT of The conference of The parTIes on ITs sIxTeenTh sessIon, held in Cancun from 
29 November to 10 December 2010, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2010).
80) U.N. climate fund sets November goal for first cash pledges, reuTers (May 21, 2014).
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the goals and, in the case of GGGI, the policy tools of the green growth 
framework. GGGI’s role in green growth transplantation is discussed infra 
Section V.
IV. Potential Critiques
Green growth, in particular the version that has been established under 
Korean law, provides a distinctive paradigm for structuring public and 
private efforts that impact environmental goals. To assess the capacity of 
Korean green growth to impact the future course of legal development, 
several major objections should be considered. We focus on two 
foundational issues: first, whether the legal “complexity” of the Act and its 
progeny obstructs efficient public administration; and second, whether 
green growth meaningfully builds upon the existing “sustainable 
development” principle in international law. Based on our analysis of these 
two issues, we then proceed to examine the international relevance of green 
growth, especially in the context of legal transplantation.
1. Green Growth as Inefficiently and Counterproductively “Complex”
Complexity theory applies theoretical models of system behavior to 
sociolegal institutions, in particular interactions between legislatures and 
administrative states, as a means of contextualizing and critiquing 
particular legal structures. As a descriptive matter, complexity theorists 
seek to explain the key forces and pressures under which law actually 
develops and to differentiate and identify some of the elaborate and (by 
definition) unpredictable81) interactions between the elements of the 
sociolegal system; normatively, the theory has also been utilized to critique 
various forms of legal policy. One such critique argues that, rather than 
81) Complexity theory suggests that while specific causal interactions may be impossible 
to predict, the trends and character of such interactions are not. See J.B. Ruhl and Harold J. 
Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law In Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal 
the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 u.c. daVIs 
l. reV. 405 (1996-1997).
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properly recognizing that administrative law is a dynamic and evolving 
system, social trends pressure the over-expansion of precise legal 
provisions in a misguided effort to create a perfected static image of the 
administrative structure.82)  
The promulgation of the Act catalyzed a sharp debate over the role of 
domestic administrative mechanisms in addressing the broad goals of 
climate change mitigation and the protection of environmental value. 83) 
Complexity theory provides analytical structure to this debate. Stated 
directly, is the policy choice embedded in the Act, to develop and 
administratively supervise an elaborate system of environmental and 
economic measures, an illustration of overly complex, and fundamentally 
counterproductive, lawmaking?  
The most potent response that can be made in defense of the LCGGFA 
is that it is not, in principle or (thus far) in practice, an attempt to “freeze” in 
time and place an idealized and comprehensive legal structure. Rather, the 
approach taken by Korean policymakers acknowledges and accommodates 
key insights from complexity theory: that regulatory law, as a system, 
should evolve through time and interact with the social and economic 
dimensions of institutional and individual behavior in the society.84) The 
particular combination of laws promulgated to advance the objectives and 
satisfy the commands of the LCGGFA will inevitably be lengthy, detailed, 
and, in many cases, issue-specific. Each such measure should be carefully 
considered, individually and in combination with other laws, to formulate 
educated predictions about the true impact and benefits and detriments of 
each law, in context. However, at the theoretical level, the delegations of 
power and framework of principles contained in the Act address the 
82) One article summarizes this view as follows: “Ironically, new and supposedly 
improved laws, the fundamental weapon the administrative state uses to weed out inequality 
and other social maladaptations, fuel yet more inequalities and maladaptations.” Id. at 413.
83) See, e.g., Seung-Kyu Rhee, Dae-Chul Jang & Younmin Chung, A critical review and new 
policy framework of low-carbon, green-growth strategy of Korea, in Green GroWTh: manaGInG The 
TransITIon To a susTaInable economy, 27-42 (2012) (criticizing the ability of the green growth 
framework to accommodate dynamic views of multiple stakeholders and to defend a vision of 
qualitative environmental value).
84) See Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 
duKe l. J. 913, 917-934 (2005).
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concern of complexity theory that administrative law, as a system, must be 
highly adaptive.
In practice, Korean lawmaking has thus far adopted an approach that 
further addresses the allegation that green growth policy cannot adapt to 
dynamic environmental and economic challenges. As an early example, the 
Act on the Construction, Etc., of Ubiquitous Cities85) exhibits two valuable 
features: though elaborate, the legislation expounds a durable and forward-
looking (incentives-sensitive, technologically adaptable) regulatory 
structure, and also creates an effective “one-stop” compliance gateway for 
developers of “U-Cities”. This latter idea, of consolidating into a single 
piece of the legislation all of the necessary regulatory measures and legal 
compliance considerations for the development of a U-City, produces 
apparent efficiencies and creates a strong basis for organized rule-making, 
enforcement, and the accommodation of socially desirable development.
2.  Viability of “Green Growth” Concept as Compared to “Sustainable 
Development”
1) Sustainable Development as a Principle of Environmental Law 
Sustainable development has long been a touchstone concept86) of 
international economic, environmental, and sociolegal philosophy.87) It 
asserts that policymakers must account for the “3E” elements: economy, 
environment, and (social) equity. The 2005 United Nations World Summit 
Outcome Document stated that “sustainable development in its economic, 
85) Act No. 9052 (March 28, 2008); most recently amended by Act. No. 9758 (June 9, 2009). 
“U-Cities” are an attempt to integrate a ubiquitous computing network into essentially all 
facets of a fully functioning urban development.
86) An early formulation of sustainable development presents the principle as follows: 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.” World commIssIon on enVIronmenT & deVelopmenT, 
our common fuTure 43 (1987). Such a definition potentially de-emphasizes economic 
development (at least beyond the level necessary for meeting present “needs”) if limitations 
on economic growth are viewed as valuable in ensuring the environmental and social stability 
necessary for safeguarding the needs of future generations. 
87) As a principle of international environmental law, sustainable development dates 
back at least to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, see supra note 
13.
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social and environmental aspects constitutes a key element of the 
overarching framework of United Nations activities.”88) Sustainable 
development emerged through time as distinguishable from, and generally 
preferred by policymakers over, other environment-related principles, such 
as the pre-existing “deep ecology” and “environmental justice” concepts.89) 
If green growth advances a different (though overlapping) policy 
framework from that which sustainable development counsels, can green 
growth be seen as refining or even succeeding sustainable development as 
an organizing principle?  Or, rather, is green growth critically missing an 
essential element of the philosophy of sustainability?  Before answering 
these questions, we first explain the role of sustainable development within 
the Act itself.
2) The LCGGFA and Sustainable Development
The LCGGFA seeks to incorporate and give concrete meaning to the 
concept of “sustainable development”; in fact, it defines the notion of 
“green economy” as the effort to “materialize the economy pursuing 
sustainable development”. The Act incorporates the definition of 
“sustainable development” from the Sustainable Development Act90): 
“development based on sustainability that is implemented simultaneously 
in the pursuit of economic growth, social stability and integration, and the 
preservation of the environment.”91) In its current form, as amended (and, 
in effect, substantially incorporated and restated) by the LCGGFA, the 
remaining provisions of the Sustainable Development Act are quite general 
and function principally to create and operate information-gathering 
channels.92)  
As the law that succeeded and directly amended the Sustainable 
Development Act, the LCGGFA contains numerous provisions that are, on 
their face, related to sustainable development. The President is charged 
88) United Nations, 2005 World summIT ouTcome, A/Res/60/1, 2 (2005).
89) See J.B. Ruhl, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Justice: 
Cooperation, then Competition, then Conflict, 9 duKe enVIr. l. & pol. forum 161 (1999).
90) Act No. 8612 (Aug. 3, 2007); amended by Act. No. 9931 (Jan. 13, 2010). Note that the 
Sustainable Development Act was amended by the LCGGFA.
91) Jisokganeungbaljeonbeop [Sustainable Development Act], Art. 2(2).
92) See Sustainable Development Act. 
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with preparing measures to address land management and efficient 
development, such as “carbon-neutral” and resource self-sufficient cities 
and other “environment-friendly” development.93) The executive branch is 
further charged with overseeing water management94) and the 
transportation network95) in a manner that both mitigates climate change 
and adapts96) to its consequences. The President lies at the center of policy-
making for design and efficiency standards to promote the proliferation of 
“green buildings”97) and is given the broad instruction to promote 
environment and energy-sustainable production and consumption choices 
by ensuring that the energy consumption and emissions resulting from 
goods and services provision are “reasonably linked to and reflected in the 
price of goods and services”.98) The executive branch of the government is 
charged with promotion of carbon sinks domestically through a variety of 
channels, including regulation of land use (forests, farmland), agriculture, 
and territorial sea waters.99) The discretion to provide developing countries 
with climate change-related “financial support”100) may have considerable 
application in the area of carbon sinks, such as aforestation and 
reforestation projects in the tropical regions of Southeast Asia.101)
3) Relationship Between Green Growth and Sustainable Development
At the most aspirational level, the LCGGFA asserts to fulfill the basic 
premise of sustainable development: that policy reflects a full consideration 
and accommodation of environmental, economic, and social justice 
considerations. As described above, the Act purports to enact a version of 
93) Act, Art. 51(2).
94) Act, Art. 52.
95) Act, Art. 53.
96) Considering the social dimension of sustainable development theory, adaptation takes 
on special significance, especially if one assumes that the most economically and socially 
vulnerable individuals would bear the heaviest burden of climate change impacts in the 
absence of effective adaptation.
97) Act, Art. 54.
98) Act, Art. 57(2).
99) Act, Art. 55.
100) Act, Art. 61.
101) See, e.g., John Leitner, The Expansive Canopy of Korean Green Growth: Key Aspects for 
Forest Conservation Projects in Southeast Asia, 10 J. Korean L. 171 (2011).
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sustainable development through particular policies that frame the context 
in which Korean development occurs and, ultimately, the physical and 
social environment in which individual Koreans live. The relevant 
provisions of the Act have an evident balance of environmental and 
economic policy: they capture the intersections of environmental 
conservation102) and harm reduction103) with intermediate- and long-term 
sound economic planning. As some economists have argued, sustaining 
and broadening the current base of Korean prosperity requires the 
utilization of emerging technology markets and, in essence, a new 
transformation of the Korean economy.104) These provisions provide a 
framework and template for the balancing and mutual satisfaction of 
environmental and economic objectives.
Does the LCGGFA accommodate the “social” dimension of 
sustainability? Various Korean scholars have criticized the Act as 
insufficiently reflecting social equity. It has been argued that Korean green 
growth elevates economic interests over the environment,105) lacks the “3E” 
balance necessary for international legitimacy,106) and does not reflect the 
public participation and support that define the implementation of social 
equity-based legislations.107) These are important considerations that, if one 
is committed to the “policy mix” prescribed by sustainable development 
orthodoxy, are serious objections. We address in detail the first and third, as 
102) The Act contains, for instance, provisions related to the preservation and promotion 
of habitats and ecosystems, such as forests and oceans.
103) In example, consider provisions related to reduced energy consumption and lowered 
carbon emissions, as enacted by measures ranging from design standards to the cap-and-trade 
system for carbon emissions that is scheduled to take effect in 2015.
104) See J.S. Lee, supra note 65; see also Dong-Xin Li & Taewon Kang, Inspiration from Green 
Effect of South Korea’s Low-Carbon Economy Development to China, 3 loW carbon economy 4 
(2012).
105) Mun Sang Deok, Noksaekseongjanggibonbeope daehan hwangyeongbeopjeok Geomto [A 
Study on Green Growth Act from the Point of View of Environmental Law], 31 enV. l. reV. 15, 37-38 
(2009).
106) Id.
107) Hahm Tae-Seong, ‘Noksaekseongjang’gwa ‘Jisokganeungbaljeon’ui gwangyejeongripe 
gwanhan beopjeok gochal [A Legal Study on the Relationship between ‘Green Growth’ and ‘Sustainable 
Development], 31 enV. l. reV. 355, 375-76 (2009).
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the second is an empirical observation that is debatable at best.108)
As to the first point: it has been alleged that the Act is structured in such 
a way as to systematically prefer economic gains to environmental 
protection. If cases inevitably arise where the two objectives are not 
synergistic, and choices and trade-offs must be made, does green growth 
systematically favor short-term wealth over long-term environmental 
health?  The Act itself does not on its face indicate that this policy resolution 
would be reached. The facilitation of investment and incentivization of 
“green industry” has been construed as pro-business, but these measures 
arguably re-contextualize the inevitable and necessary expansion of 
business ventures in a manner that best harmonizes economic activity with 
environmental protection. The notion that each economy-related policy 
should be tested against not just environmental impact assessments, but 
also equity analysis, and that a certain “sustainable” conclusion much be 
reached for each policy, burdens green growth with achieving the elusive 
objective of social justice that should be the perpetual quest of all law and 
policy. In short, if green growth-related policies do achieve significant 
popular support109) and are defensible on the basis of environmental 
impact, the Act instructs the government to accomplish those objectives 
that are achievable and can provide at least incremental advancement in the 
direction of environmental protection and optimization of social welfare.
Can the social equity element of sustainable development be satisfied by 
a certain threshold of public support for green growth policies?  Social 
equity may, in some cases, require more than majoritarian support. 
Especially given the disparity of impact of ecological harms according to 
socioeconomic status, environmental policy in a society that enshrines 
108) As discussed supra, sustainability has been an embedded component of international 
environmental law rhetoric for more than two decades. However, the ubiquity of sustainable 
development as a referenced concept does not indicate that it cannot be supplemented or, as 
the Act purports to do, integrated into an elaborated vision for policy implementations. 
Therefore, the objection that Korean green growth is inadequate on an international stage due 
to the established position of sustainable development is unavailing.
109) Especially in a vigorous young democracy like Korea, it can be a daunting task to 
sustain popular support and political will. See, e.g., John A. Matthews, Green growth 
strategies—Korean initiatives, 44 fuTures 761, 761-769 (2012). One of the perpetual challenges of 
social sustainability is a durable political coalition in favor of a shared green growth 
commitment.
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equality, due process, and even clean environment-related rights must 
account for the impact on groups that are politically vulnerable due to lack 
of expressed voice through the electoral process. The vast discretion vested 
in the executive by the Act provides, ideally, an opportunity for accounting 
of interests, entitlements, and minimum standards. Where this process of 
protecting the rights of minorities is not happening effectively, litigation 
and private enforcement of statutory provisions or even defense of 
individual constitutional rights can potentially invoke the judicial review 
power of the Korean courts. 
Inasmuch as the broad outlines of green growth policy should be driven 
by the general popular will, however, is green growth consistent with the 
preferences of the Korean people?  Some specific projects identified as 
green growth-related have been subject to intense public scrutiny and been 
heavily modified or abandoned as a result.110)  However, this does not 
reveal a defect in the LCGGFA framework, but rather the proper 
functioning of political discourse and debate in defining the applications of 
the framework in the future. The failure of any particular initiative is at 
once a reaffirmation that ultimate oversight in a transparent and open 
democracy lies with the polity, and also an invitation to policymakers to 
continually innovate the manner of translating the broad outlines of green 
growth into concrete and implemented government action. Further, the 
lengthy public deliberation over Korea’s most famous green growth 
implementing legislation to date, the cap-and-trade bill, and the ultimate 
consensus that emerged in the National Assembly,111) provide a vivid 
illustration of an engaged democratic process.
V. International Impact: Transplantation
The Korean government and GGGI have both shown considerable 
interest in facilitating the international study of green growth and the use of 
Korean laws and regulations as potential models. Put simply, Korea has 
encouraged the transplantation of the green growth framework, and 
110) One such example is the “Four Rivers Project”. See Hahm, supra note 107.
111) See Han, supra note 57.
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specific green growth concepts, to other legal systems. Through such 
transplantations, the LCGGFA may exert significant influence, especially in 
the Southeast Asian region. We briefly explain the idea of legal 
transplantation before describing the present and future prospects for the 
“exportation” of green growth principles to other nations. 
1. Transplantation in Environmental Law
The concept of “legal transplantation” as a means of analyzing changes 
in legal systems was popularized by Professor Alan Watson in his book 
“Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law”112), but the term 
(and its basic idea) date back further.113) Transplantation may be defined 
generally as borrowings between and amongst legal systems, ranging from 
the adoption (or imposition) of an entire legal system to the excerpted 
borrowings of particular laws and policies.114) In the modern context, 
transplantation may be of vital importance in environmental legislation.115) 
Because of the global nature of environmental problems and the reality that 
solutions must engage many nations as active participants,116) environment 
and international development are particularly well suited to the 
harmonized benefits that deliberate and organized transplantation can 
accomplish.117) Concerning green growth in particular, transplantation from 
Korea to other nations has arguably already begun, and may continue on 
the basis of the domestic benefits that other nations can derive from such 
borrowings; should this trend continue, compatible green growth approaches 
112) Alan Watson, leGal TransplanTs: an approach To comparaTIVe laW (1974).
113) According to the distinguished scholar and dean of Harvard Law School, Roscoe 
Pound, as quoted almost 100 years ago, the “history of a system of law is largely a history of 
borrowings of legal materials from other legal systems and of assimilation of materials from 
outside the law.”  Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: legal Transplants 
and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, ecol. l. Q. 1295, 1296 (2001).
114) See Watson, supra note 112.
115) See generally Wiener, supra note 113.
116) See Wiener, supra note 24.
117) See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, 
The Emergence of Global Administrative Law: Foreword: Global Governance as Administration – 
National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 laW & conTemp. prob. 1 
(2005).
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in multiple nations might have the important collateral benefit of yielding 
greater capacities for transnational collaborations and institutional linkages.
2. Transplantation of Korean Green Growth
Can the Korean green growth legal framework be usefully transplanted, 
in whole or in part, to the domestic legal systems of other nations? The 
Korean approach is particularly well-suited to a nation with a preference 
and capacity for policies that encompass a broad set of environmental 
goals, including but not limited to the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The framework approach may be appropriate for nations that 
have the political and social capacity to proceed with green growth policies 
on an initially domestic scale, with potential bilateral and multilateral 
projects in the future. Nations with a citizenry or political leadership that 
insists upon broad international consensus and commitment as a condition 
precedent to adopting “green” policies may not benefit from the Korean 
approach. Further, developing nations may find Korean green growth more 
suitable and attractive than developed nations; in the case of the latter, 
Korean-style green growth legislation may not represent an efficient and 
targeted supplement to existing economic and environmental policies.
Particular characteristics that would promote transplantability include: 
a strong central policymaker (similar to the President) who can utilize the 
general framework and coordinate the efforts of regulatory bodies to enact 
concrete green growth-related policies; an openly acknowledged national 
goal to achieve a heightened stature in the international community; and a 
desire to facilitate cooperation with other nations implementing similar 
legislation, including (but not limited to) Korea.
In predicting the potential for the Act and (and Korean green growth 
policies more generally) to impact the legal frameworks adopted and 
implemented in other nations, one central and readily transplantable idea is 
the direct inclusion of mechanisms for linkage with domestic laws of other 
nations, and with international market mechanisms.118)  Some of the other 
118) For a discussion of the potential of the LCGGFA to establish linkages with 
international market mechanisms, see Jae-Hyup Lee, Noksaekseongjanggibonbeopui 
chinhwangyeongjeok silhyeonul uihan beopjeoksudan: Gihubyeonhwadaeung sijangjeok mechanismul 
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general principles may also find a relatively broad audience. Of particular 
note are the heavy emphasis on incentive-based instruments119) and the 
cultivation of broad and inclusive incentive structures. This incentives 
approach, a signature of the Act, is intended to create a decision-making 
environment for entities and individuals that rewards choices seen as 
reinforcing specific green growth objectives. Actual “transplantation” of the 
framework may be of more regional influence, but could be a reality in East 
and Southeast Asia120) amongst nations well-situated to benefit from 
partnership with Korea and to make comparatively favored contributions 
to multinational efforts at environmentally sound growth.
If Korean green growth is and continues to be utilized as a basis for laws 
and policy strategies in other nations, it will represent, in the history of 
Korean legal evolution, a dramatic inflection point. Korea has, for more 
than a century, been the recipient of many transplantations of law, many of 
them literal, and, in the early Twentieth Century, many of them under 
compulsion.121) Korea’s foundational codes, the Civil Code and the Criminal 
Code, were introduced during the Japanese occupation, and were 
translated from the Japanese (Japan, in turn, had borrowed them from 
Germany and France).122) Other examples of imported law are numerous; 
the Korean Copyright Act represents just one specific illustration.123)  While 
jungsimuro [Legal Measures to Fulfill Eco-friendly Implementation of the Proposed Basic Law on 
Green Growth: Market Mechanisms for Responding to Climate Change], 31 enV. l. reV. 39, 61 
(2009).
119) For an analysis of the benefit and importance of market-based mechanisms and an 
argument of their expansion in environmental regulation, see Chun Jaekyong, 
Hwangyeonggyuje paradigmui jaepyeon [Paradigm Shift of Environmental Regulation], 32 enV. l. 
reV. 81, 106 (2010).
120) We discuss below the collaborations that have already occurred in the adoption of 
green growth reforms in Cambodia.
121) Michael J. Seth, a concIse hIsTory of modern Korea: from The laTe nIneTeenTh 
cenTury To The presenT 43 (2010) (describing Japanese colonial rule of Korea). The Japanese 
codes, in turn, were based on the civil law codes of continental European nations, especially 
Germany and France. Tom Ginsburg, Introduction: The Politics of Legal Reform in Korea, leGal 
reform In Korea 2-3 (Tom Ginsburg, ed. 2004).
122) Id. See also Walter Wallace McLaren, a polITIcal hIsTory of Japan durInG The meIJI 
era: 1867-1912 (Cass 1965) (1916).
123) See Soo-Kil Chang et al., InTellecTual properTy laW In Korea 121 (Christopher Heath 
ed., 2003); see also John Leitner, A Legal and Cultural Comparison of File-Sharing Disputes in Japan 
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the post-World War II era has seen many innovations by Korean 
lawmakers, the trajectory of Korea-related borrowing remains in the 
direction of Korea as the recipient of foreign-made law. The significant 
international interest in the LCGGFA suggests that, in this area of policy, 
Korea may become, arguably for the first time, a source nation for legal 
transplantation. As discussed by Watson, a major basis for historical 
transplantations is the status of a particular source of law or legal 
jurisdiction as an established innovator.124)  The utilization of aspects of 
Korean green growth by other nations would be meaningful endorsements 
of Korea’s efforts as efficacious and importable policy.
3. Green Growth Transplantation in Practice
Korea is uniquely situated in a “bridge” position between developing 
and developed nations. One of only two nations to transition from charter 
membership in the G77 to membership in the OECD, Korea is a G20 nation 
and has realized a sustained and dramatic growth trajectory that has 
catapulted the nation from total lack of development to wealth and global 
prominence in approximately 50 years.125) In many respects, Korea occupies 
the status of a developed nation: an aid-provider, capable security ally to 
the United States, and responsible stakeholder in a variety of international 
and intergovernmental institutions. Korea possesses considerable material 
and infrastructural resources, but also an awareness of the essential nature 
of sustained growth for developing nations, and a domestic agenda that 
does not neglect Korea’s continuing need for the individual and collective 
benefits of economic development. This context has been essential in 
facilitating Korea’s work with other nations, especially in Southeast Asia, to 
promote the transplantation of green growth. 
The cooperative efforts of Korea and GGGI with Cambodia provide the 
clearest case thus far of transplantation in action. Cambodia adopted an 
and the Republic of Korea and Implications for Future Cyber-Regulation, 22 colum. J. asIan l. 1, 
8-10 (2008).
124) See Watson, supra note 112.
125) See J.S. Lee, supra note 65, at 23-26.
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initial green growth plan in 2009,126) but greatly developed its legislative 
and regulatory approach in subsequent years. In 2011, Cambodia joined 
GGGI and separately entered into a memorandum of understanding with 
Korea in order to facilitate collaboration between the nations’ governments.127) 
GGGI used the Korean green growth program as a model in advising 
Cambodia, recommending that a national committee, master plan for green 
growth, and intermediate-range plans could parallel Korea’s presidential 
committee, the LCGGFA, and Korea’s successive five-year plans.128) In 2013, 
Cambodia adopted a “Korean-style” administrative approach to green 
growth by establishing a national committee to function as the steering 
body for green growth policy, adopting the national plan formulated in 
consultation with GGGI, and setting forth a national action plan for the 
period from 2013 to 2030.129) The Cambodian framework takes a similar 
approach to Korea by establishing an administrative structure that 
promotes and supervises green growth policies on a sectoral basis, with the 
ultimate objective of facilitating economic value creation through green 
technologies and industry.130)  
Why would transplantation of green growth be of interest to both 
Cambodia and Korea?  While conjectural, certain benefits seem likely on 
both sides of the transplantation. Cambodia benefits from the expertise of 
cooperative Korean officials and GGGI staff, who worked closely with 
Cambodia to develop its master plan for green growth.131) Cambodia is not 
presently well-positioned to rapidly develop green technology innovations, 
126) Kirti Avishek, Xiubo Yu & Jian Liu, Ecosystem management in Asia Pacific: Bridging 
science–policy gap, 3 enVIronmenTal deVelopmenT 77, 85 (2012).
127) E.Y. Mohammed, S. Wang & G. Kawaguchi, Making Growth Green and Inclusive: The 
Case of Cambodia, oecd Green GroWTh papers, No. 2013/08, 18 (2013).
128) GGGI’s advice for Cambodia is expressed in consolidated form in presentation 
materials of GGGI’s former Cambodia Program Manager. See Helen Lee, GGGI’s Cambodia 
Green Growth Program (2012), available at http://lowemissionsasia.org/sites/default/files/
pdf_file/GGGI%E2%80%99s%20Cambodia%20Green%20Growth%20Program%20
Development%20Impact%20Assessment%20-%20Helen%20Lee.pdf.
129) Green Growth: A Greener Cambodia, cambodIa herald (March 19, 2013).
130) See Danh Serey, Green Growth for Sustainable Development in Cambodia, available at 
http://www.mfa.go.th/business/contents/images/text_editor/files/(cambodia)GG%20
fo%20SD%20in%20Cambodia%20Oct%202013.pptx.
131) See Helen Lee, supra note 128.
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but it can meaningfully benefit from the more efficient use of energy and 
resources, as well as from a more deliberate approach to promoting a 
healthful environment. For Korea, the prominence and influence of green 
growth can be the source of significant prestige; more tangibly, if green 
growth-related economic and environmental innovations acquire 
heightened international value in the future, Korea may well realize a “first 
mover” advantage.
The ultimate similarities between Korean and Cambodian green growth 
will depend upon the future experience of both nations (and the degree to 
which each society remains committed to the green growth vision). 
Already, though, the Cambodian example demonstrates the potential for 
the diffusion of green growth, especially if Korean government ministries, 
GGGI, and other institutions continue to work to facilitate transplantations.
VI. Five-year Plan of Implementation of the LCGGFA
The Korean government prepared a five-year plan for green growth in 
order to implement the long-term plan of “green growth as national 
strategy.” The first five-year plan of green growth launched in 2009, 
presenting 387 detailed tasks. The second five-year plan of green growth, 
which focuses on successful settlement of green growth institutions, will 
begin in 2014.
1. Major Achievements and Limitations of the First Five-Year Plan
The first five-year plan of green growth elevated the issue of climate 
change to the national development agenda and emphasized “coexistence 
of economy and environment.” In view of the importance of 
institutionalization, the Korean government established a government-
wide system to promote green growth implementation during the early 
stages of the first five-year plan. The LCGGFA and its implementing 
ordinance were enacted in 2010; the Committee on Green Growth, headed 
by the Prime Minister’s Office, has taken a leadership role since 2009 in 
promoting green growth policies at the local government level. 
The plan sets the target reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, which 
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was the highest level among developing countries, at 30% below “business-
as-usual” by the year 2020.132) The Korean government introduced several 
detailed plans to achieve this goal. A target management system for 
greenhouse gas and energy was established, and the Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory and Research Center was founded in 2010. Furthermore, new 
legislation was enacted in 2012, providing a legal basis for the future 
implementation of an emissions reduction system utilizing market 
mechanisms, such as an emissions trading scheme.133) As discussed supra, 
the Korean emissions trading system is scheduled to commence in 2015.
The research and development of green technology were also 
emphasized; the Korean government secured a budget for research and 
development of green technology in its efforts to match the level of green 
technology of developed countries. The Korean government actively 
participated in promoting green growth at the global level, suggesting 
green growth as an agenda in the G20 summit, and adopting a modified 
version of the OECD’s green growth strategy. The Korean government 
succeeded in becoming the host venue for the secretariat of the GCF and 
establishing GGGI, affirming its international leadership in the field of 
green growth. 
However, the first five-year plan was somewhat unsatisfactory in 
producing tangible outcomes. The Korean government injected 89.3 trillion 
won into the implementation of green growth policy, but major green 
industries such as solar power generation and smart grid systems failed to 
achieve the expected results. As the government played the leading role in 
the first five-year plan, the plan depended heavily on regulating energy 
supply, and consequently neglected the importance of managing energy 
consumption; stakeholders other than central and local governments were 
virtually excluded from the plan. The aforementioned limitations have 
made many reluctant to evaluate the first five-year plan favorably.
132) Suk Gee-hyun, Korea aims for 30% cut in carbon emissions by 2020, Korea herald 
(January 28, 2014).
133) Onsilgas baechulkwonui haldang mit georae e gwanhan beopryul [Act on the 
Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse-gas Emission Permits], Act No. 11419, May 14, 2012.
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2. Plan and Outlook of the Second Five-Year Plan 
As the first five-year plan successfully built the institutional basis for 
green growth policy, the second five-year plan will focus on achieving 
tangible outcomes of green growth policy. The Korean government has set 
four basic policies for the second five-year plan, based on its analysis of the 
present situation. First, during the second five-year term, the government 
will implement the plan with an emphasis on core areas of green growth, 
namely the effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, establishment 
of a sustainable energy system, and scaled-up capacity for adapting to 
climate change. Second, green growth policy will lead to a stimulated 
“creative economy” by combining green technology and ICT (information 
and communications technology) and reinforcing development of green 
technology and green industry. Third, the government will work closely 
with the private sector in implementing green growth policy. Fourth, the 
balance and harmony of economy, environment, and society will be 
emphasized.134) 
The philosophical mission of the second five-year plan is to realize the 
well-being of the people through balanced development of economy and 
environment. To serve that end, the Korean government set 20 core 
objectives of green growth. Those objectives are expected to elevate Korea 
to a global leadership position on green growth policy and economics, to 
enhance Korean companies’ competitive position, and to provide the 
Korean people with a safe and pleasant environment. The central 
government and the metropolitan council will draft a detailed scheme of 
implementing the second five-year plan, and the Committee on Green 
Growth will accordingly evaluate the scheme.135)
134) Office for Government Policy Coordination, Prime Minister’s Secretariat, The second 
Green GroWTh 5-year plan confIrmed, June 3, 2014, available at https://www.kiet.re.kr/part/
sDownload.jsp?s_idx=39151.
135) Id.
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3. Future Prospects of the LCGGFA in Korea
As explained above, the concept of green growth has been a central 
political agenda during the previous government’s five years in power. 
However, in the incumbent president Park’s government, it seems that the 
concept of green growth has lost its progenitive power within the 
government. Despite the ambitious goals of the second five-year plan, few 
references to “green growth” are found in the government publications of 
the Park administration thus far. In many policy documents, the term is 
replaced with the new concept of “creative economy”. However, it cannot 
be denied that policy measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change are 
still very essential parts of the current government and will remain critical 
to future governments. In this sense, it will be very interesting to observe 
how the concept of green growth is moderated and modified in the Korean 
executive’s future policy agendas, and these choices will be critical signals 
as to whether, and in what form, green growth will continue to shape 
Korean public policy and remain prominent in international affairs.
VII. Conclusion
Due to the nature of the Act as a “framework” for future lawmaking, 
the ultimate implications of green growth for Korea and other nations will 
be determined through time, as major green growth policies continue to be 
implemented. However, its influence can already be seen. Green growth 
has assumed the position of a bedrock concept that, as described in Korean 
law, is simultaneously an embodiment of, and a substitute for, other 
paradigmatic principles, most conspicuously “sustainable development”.
As this article focuses on the relevance and applicability of Korean 
green growth to other nations, and its possible contribution to international 
law, relatively little attention is paid to the particular social and political 
conditions of Korea. However, it may be worthwhile to briefly note that 
Korea as a society has recently experienced dramatic change, and a state of 
political dynamism continues to persist. In the area of environmental law in 
particular, Korea has in the last twenty years passed a flurry of legislation, 
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though many measures have been largely unenforced.136)  Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, Korea was not designated as an Annex I nation, a “developing” 
status that seems now inconsistent with its level of development and per 
capita GDP.137) The Act provided a dramatic entrance of Korea onto the 
world stage as a potentially serious factor in any emerging international 
understanding of environmental and energy policy. We are hopeful that 
the Act, still in its nascent stages of implementation, can prove a reliable 
foundation for addressing economic and social challenges facing Korea 
and, potentially, other nations as well.
As a cautionary note for generalizing the benefits of green growth, some 
Korean theorists conceive of green growth as just the latest revolution in the 
Korean economy.138) Citing a post-Korean War economy that was founded 
upon cost-advantageous and low-skill manufacturing, then transformed 
into a knowledge-based, high-skill manufacturing economy, these 
economists see “green economy” as the tool to Korea’s continued growth 
and economic ascension.139) The very basis of this notion is not that “a rising 
tide lifts all boats”, but rather that Korea can once more utilize the 
opportunities available to it to achieve a comparative advantage. A 
fundamental tension, not just in transplantability of particular legislation 
but in international cooperation in “green growth” in general, is the extent 
to which green growth benefits may be at least partially exclusive and 
subject to strategic acquisition and utilization by specific nations. In this 
regard, the cooperation between Korea, civil society, and other nations will 
be critical in determining whether green growth can ultimately serve as a 
shared paradigm for realizing international environmental objectives.
136) Or, at a minimum, under-enforced. See Cho, supra note 37.
137) In a post-Kyoto regime, Korea seems likely to be included in an Annex I or 
equivalent categorization, and recent efforts and proposals reflect the realization and 
preparation for such a transition. See Hong Sik Cho, Urinara gihubyeonhwadaechaekbeopui 
jeonmang [A Prospect of Korea’s Climate Change Response Act], 30 enV. l. reV. 311, 337 (2008).
138) See J.S. Lee, supra note 65, at 43-48.
139) Id.

